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By Minseong Kim∗
A common question against macroeconomics of public debts
is: why should one think government budget constraint is bind-
ing when government, at least technically, can print out money
to pay for debts. Out of compatible answers, we explore an an-
swer that is not usually invoked. While in OLG models, gov-
ernment bonds can successfully exist as rational bubbles, con-
cerns of time consistency leave trade-offs in exploiting break-
down of the economy-wise public debt transversality condition.
Government budget constraint is one of most certain means to
fight time consistency issues and ensure that market stability
is achieved.
JEL: E13, E42, E52, E61, E62, E63
Keywords: government budget constraint, transversality con-
dition
I. Introduction
It is well-known that in overlapping generation (OLG) models, breakdown
of an economy-wise transversality condition for an asset is possible, while
satisfying transversality conditions for individual agents. Applied to public
debts, this can lead to a suggestion that government fully exploits breakdown
of the transversality condition and carries out policies without feeling bound
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2by government budget constraint. Thus OLG models seem to overcome the
transversality condition problem outlined in Kim (2019). Furthermore, OLG
models naturally allow for the quantity effect: interest rate affects demanded
government bonds quantity.
We construct a simple overlapping generation (OLG) model and demon-
strate that time consistency concerns raised in Kim (2019) are not avoided
in an OLG model. Government debts honoring the economy-wise transver-
sality condition helps to overcome time inconsistency problems, and thus
the transversality condition problem is connected to the time consistency
problem.
An economy initially can have no time consistency problem, only later
to experience time inconsistency issues - for example, ‘old generation’ may
no longer sell all bonds it holds to ‘young generation’ because of change in
economic structure, which was not the case in former economic structure.
Differently said, government (including central bank) wishing to roll over
bonds or debts by issuing new bonds may not be able to find sufficient
‘young generation’ demands. The problem is avoided by a sound fiscal
policy.
II. Fiscal-monetary coordination
One of central questions in macroeconomics is how far fiscal-monetary co-
ordination is required for conducts of monetary policy. Conventional anal-
ysis suggests that such coordination is unnecessary, as can be witnessed in
McCallum and Nelson (2005) and Woodford (2003). One can see analysis
concluding otherwise - see Negro and Sims (2015) as an example.
In one aspect, Kim (2019) can be read as asking whether fiscal-monetary
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coordination is more required than we ever thought. The time consistency
issue and the transversality condition problem suggest that Bt = 0 (net
zero government or central bank bonds) is required for an equilibrium, but
when Bt = 0, conducts of monetary policy are at risk. To avoid this,
fiscal policy needs to be conducted such that government bonds or surplus
can appropriately be generated, while maintaining the spirit of Bt = 0:
that eventually, government (including central bank) must actually pay back
debts, instead of continuously rolling over by new bonds.
As aforementioned, OLG models seem to provide a promising escape from
the transversality condition problem - government bonds can be supported
as rational bubbles and the economy-wise transversality condition is violated
while individual transversality conditions are satisfied. But because OLG
models are not safe from the time consistency issue, this escape does not
always work, and the economy-wise transversality condition may have to be
imposed (‘fiscal discipline’) to provide market stability.
III. A simple OLG model, time inconsistency and government
budget constraint
Each consumer i lives for three periods - from time i to i+ 2. Consumer
i maximizes utility Ui:
(1) Ui =
i+2∑
t=i
βi
[
C1−σi,t
1− σ
−
N
1+ϕ
i,t
1 + ϕ
]
subject to budget constraint for period t = i and t = i+ 1:
(2) PtCi,t +
Bi,t
1 + it
≤ WtNi,t + Fi,t +Bi,t−1
4and budget constraint for period t = i+ 2:
(3) PtCi,t ≤ Bi,t−1
where Ci,t represents consumption at time t by consumer i, Bi,t represents
government or central bank bond purchased at time t by consumer i to be
redeemed at time t + 1 with value Bi,t. it represents nominal interest rate,
Ni,t represents labor of consumer i utilized for production.
We now consider consumer i in period i+ 1 and i+ 2 and consumer i+ 1
in the same periods. From consumer optimizations, we get:
(4)
(
Ci,i+2
Ci+1,i+2
)
−σ
=
(1− γ)
γ
(
βi+1
βi
)
where
(5)
1− γ
γ
=
(
Ci,i+1
Ci+1,i+1
)
−σ
That is, an OLG model repeats the time consistency issue outlined in Kim
(2019).
We may avoid this time inconsistency conclusion if Bt = 0 and thus mone-
tary policy is assumed to be non-existent. As stated in Kim (2019), whether
the time consistency issue is really eliminated depends on supply-side de-
tails, but Bt = 0 is the necessary condition here, as long as the consumer
side is not modified.
One can also note that if each consumer i only lives for two periods, then
the time inconsistency issue is also avoided.
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A. Government budget constraint
Of course this is not the end of the story. The lesson of the above Bt = 0
conclusion is that government bonds cannot be left as bubbles, if one cares
about market stability. Enter fiscal policy, which modifies the consumer
side. Then the generalization of the Bt = 0 conclusion says that government
bonds must actually be paid back, whether in future or today, represented
by the economy-wise transversality condition, by taxation or other revenues
generated. Thus, government budget constraint becomes binding.
IV. Conclusion: stability versus efficiency?
Sargent (2011) explores trade-offs between stability and efficiency in choice
of a monetary system. The theme was similar here: while OLG models al-
low for better welfare through rational bubbles of government bonds with-
out proper fiscal backing, a monetary system relying on the rational bubble
strategy is unstable, considering a possible switch from an economic struc-
ture allowing for time-consistent decisions to an economic structure that has
the time inconsistency issue.
In the end, this is matter of a policy choice and empirical analysis. Even
with inevitable appearance of a dynamic disequilibrium in reality, as long as
it eventually settles down, people may be better welfare-wise with instability.
But costs of disequilibrium must be factored in for welfare calculations.
Conventional analysis values stability - thus government budget constraint
becomes binding, despite initial appearance that it is not so.
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